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Abstract:  
Economic analyses of farm policies generally focus on the long run, steady state impacts 
while the transition dynamics are often overlooked. In this paper we develop a determinist 
dynamic computable general equilibrium analysis allowing agents to form imperfect versus 
pefect expectations. Using an illustrative CAP reform scenario, we simulate an abrupt versus 
a gradual implementation of this reform. Our results show that if economic agents are able to 
perfectly  anticipate  the  impacts  of  the  reform,  then  delaying  its  implementation  is  never 
optimal. On the other hand, if agents gradually learn from market developments, then we find 
some cases where a gradual implementation of this reform is welfare improving. Such gradual 
implementation allows minimizing adjustment costs.  
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Introduction 
Agricultural  policies  in  developed  countries  have  undergone  several  reforms  since  their 
creation. These reforms have almost always been implemented gradually. This is notably the 
case of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU): the reduction of 
support  prices  begun  in  1992  and  was  reinforced  in  1999  and  2003  reforms  while  the 
decoupling of farm payments started in 2003 and was pursued with the 2008 Health Check.  
This gradual implementation of agricultural policy reforms can first be explained by political 
considerations. Indeed these reforms are often difficult to agree upon due the opposition of 
stakeholder including farmers. A gradual reform generally benefits from a better acceptability. 
Secondly there might be a time lag between the implementation of  a reform and agents’ 
adaptation to the new policy because of adjustment costs. Hence reforming gradually may 
lessen these adjustment costs and may be economically justified. On the other hand, a too 
long implementation of a reform may ultimately become inefficient if the steady state benefits 
are postponed too far away and are thus heavily discounted. A quick implementation can also 
be  motivated  by  other  political  considerations.  Indeed  a  quick  implementation  at  the 
beginning of a new administration confers some credibility to its elected members (Haggard 
and Webb, 1993). Furthermore this allows the new policy to be well embedded and benefits 
materialize before the end of the mandate and the new elections. Accordingly, governments 
face both economic and political trade-offs when deciding the implementation of a reform.  
To our knowledge, few economic analyses focus on the transition dynamics and thus deal 
with this issue. Furthermore only a small part of the existing studies specifically addresses 
agricultural policy issues. Among these is the analysis of Yanagida et al. (1987) who argue 
that suppressing immediately agricultural price supports in the US is preferable to suppressing 
them gradually. The reason is that a gradual reform generates cyclical market movements. 
However this study is based on an econometric model focused on market impacts without any 
computation  of  economic  welfare  effects.  On  the  contrary,  using  a  dynamic  Computable 
General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  framework  with  static  expectations  for  investment  decisions, 
Levy  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1995)  argue  that  a  progressive  liberalisation  of  Mexican 
agriculture is preferable to an immediate reform. Even if an immediate liberalisation induces 
larger economic gains, the authors prove that gradualism is not very costly while it allows 
mitigating the welfare losses for the group affected. The analysis of Adams et al. (2001) 
confirms this trade-off between smoothness and short run efficiency losses. These authors 
develop  a  dynamic  CGE  model  on  the  Danish  economy,  with  static  versus  perfect   3 
expectations, to analyse the implementation of a quota on pig production. They conclude that 
whether  announcement  (gradual)  or  surprise  (abrupt)  implementation  is  to  be  preferred 
depends on agents’ attitude towards risks and how they discount the future. On the other hand, 
the position of Malakkelis (1998) on the optimal timing of a tariff reform for Australia is 
more definitive. He shows using a dynamic CGE model with perfect expectations that, even if 
both type of reforms lead to similar long term effects, reforming immediately is better than 
reforming gradually. The reason is that the economy adjusts more slowly when the reform is 
progressive: the earlier tariffs on capital goods are suppressed, the earlier allocation efficiency 
gains are realized. These different studies rely on different models, on different assumptions 
concerning agents’ expectations and inter temporal decisions, and focus on different policy 
issues. Their results are thus hardly comparable. However their contrasting conclusions show 
that the issue of the optimal implementation of policy reforms is still open and that several 
factors can influence it.  
In  this  article  we  focus  on  the  role  played  by  price  and  return  expectations  formed  by 
economic  agents.  The  basic  intuition  is  the  following:  the  more  stakeholders  are  able  to 
correctly  anticipate  the  market  effects  of  the  reforms,  the  more  the  reforms  can  be 
implemented quickly. Adams et al. also express this intuition but do not formally test it. More 
generally  different  economic  studies  have  already  shown  that  these  expectations  can  be 
crucial  when  evaluating  policy  reforms  (Pereira  and  Shoven,  1988).  In  particular  Ballard 
(1987)  shows  with  a  dynamic  CGE  model  for  the  US  economy  characterized  by  many 
distortions, that the implementation of a consumption tax in the US in place of the income tax 
can generate lower welfare gains if agents perfectly anticipate the future than if they make 
adaptive expectations. The reason is that the taxation of consumption leads to an increase of 
capital stock, and if consumers have perfect foresight they expect the induced decrease of 
capital  returns,  leading  them  to  reduce  their  savings  before  the  reform.  This,  in  turns, 
generates a welfare loss which does not occur if consumers do not anticipate the effect of the 
reform before its implementation.  In the same vein, Thissen and  Lensink (2001) ,using a 
dynamic CGE model for Egypt, find that a currency devaluation which is perfectly anticipated 
by economic agents has a negative effect on pre reform investments and production. These 
negative  effects  are  absent  with  adaptive  expectations.  This  issue  of  expectations  is  not 
specific to dynamic CGE analyses of macro-economic reforms. For instance, Scandizzo et al. 
(1983) develop a static partial equilibrium model calibrated on a stylised farm market. These 
authors find that the welfare gains of a price stabilisation reform are higher the more agents   4 
are  naïve;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  most  of  the  gains  could  be  reaped  if  agents  were  better 
informed. This cost of naivety suggests that, if agents are not fully rational and adjust their 
expectations along with time, a gradual reform is preferable because it allows them to learn 
and improve their information progressively.  
If the aforementioned studies provide some insights about the role played by expectations on 
the optimal implementation of reforms, none of them specifically addresses this issue. In that 
context, our main objective in this article is to investigate this overlooked issue. We obviously 
focus  on  farmers  who  potentially  face  major  changes  from  agricultural  reforms.  In  this 
respect, we develop a dynamic CGE model aimed at simulating the effects of agricultural 
policy reforms on farm markets and welfare. This dynamic model is developed using different 
expectations schemes, ranging from perfect foresight to pure naivety. Using this framework, 
we simulate the effects of a radical reform, namely the total suppression of the CAP in the EU 
arable  crop  sectors  (cereals  and  oilseeds).  This  shock  is  implemented  in  one  step  or 
implemented gradually (over five years). Our simulation results show that if economic agents 
have perfect expectations, then delaying the implementation of reforms is never optimal. On 
the other hand, if agents gradually learn from market developments because of their imperfect 
expectations, then we find some cases where a progressive implementation of a radical reform 
is welfare improving while an abrupt implementation may generate significant welfare losses 
in the short run.  
The next part of this article is devoted to a brief description of our dynamic CGE model with 
a special focus on the links between the form of expectations and the dynamic decisions of the 
model. The results of the simulations conducted under different assumptions concerning the 
implementation of the reform and the expectations of economic agents are then presented. We 
also perform sensitivity analysis of main results to our assumptions on the level of adjustment 
costs and on the imperfect nature of expectations. Finally we conclude.  
 
1. Modelling frameworks 
We develop two consistent dynamic CGE models. In the first version agents are assumed to 
have  perfect  expectations  while  the  second  one  they  are  assumed  to  have  adaptive 
expectations,  the  case  of  naïve  and  static  expectations  being  particular  cases.  In  a  first 
subsection  we  present  the  main  characteristics  of  the  perfect  expectation  version.  The   5 
necessary changes to the model to switch from the perfect to the adaptive expectations version 
are then described in a second subsection.  
 
1.1. The version with perfect expectations 
We start from the static version of the widely used Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
model.  More  precisely,  our  point  of  departure  is  the  GTAP-AGR  model  which  offers  a 
detailed representation of the farm and food sectors (Keeney and Hertel, 2005). In this static 
CGE model, savings by household are a fixed proportion of domestic income. Then a world 
bank collects savings from all countries and allocates world saving to regional investments 
according to expected regional capital returns. These expected capital returns decline with 
investments according to an ad hoc log-log specification.  
In  our  dynamic  CGE  models,  we  develop  alternative  specifications  of  these  saving  and 
investment  dynamic  decisions.  They  result  from  consistent  micro-economic  dynamic 
optimisation programs. Different expectation schemes by economic agents can be introduced 
in these programs.  
 
1.1.1  Producers’ behaviours 
Producers’ behaviours result from both intra and inter temporal decisions. At each time period 
producers maximise capital returns by combining primary factors (capital, labour, and land in 
the  case  of  agricultural  producers)  and  intermediate  consumption  through  nested  CES 
functions. Land and labour endowments in each region are assumed to be fixed, although they 
can be reallocated across agricultural sectors or across non agricultural sectors at each period. 
Capital, once installed in a sector, is assumed to be fixed in the current period. However this 
sectoral capital stock changes with firms’ investment from one period to another, namely: 
( ) t r i t r i r i t r i I K K , , , , , 1 , , . 1 + - = + d  
with  t r i K , ,   the  capital  stock  installed  in  region  r  and  sector  i  in  period  t,  t r i I , , the  new 
investment made in period t and  ir d  the depreciation rate of capital. The optimal investment 
may be positive or negative. This optimal investment is precisely determined by the inter-
temporal dimension of producers’ decisions. Producers seek to maximize the present value of   6 
their  firm  (Devarajan  and  Go,  1998),  which  corresponds  to  the  discounted  value  of  their 
expected future profits (capital income) minus their expected future investment costs: 
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With r  the interest rate,  t r i wk , , the expected capital unitary return,  t r i PI , , the expected price of 
the investment good. The term 
t r i







 represents the installation cost of capital with  r i, j  a 
structural  parameter  (McKibbin  and  Wilcoxen,  1999).  Solving  this  optimisation  problem 
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To facilitate the economic interpretation of this implicit equation, let’s first assume that the 
installation cost parameter is null. The right hand side is then the marginal cost of investment 
in  period  t  evaluated  in  period  t+1.  The  left  hand  side  is  the  marginal  revenue  of  this 
investment: it equals the next period expected capital returns and the next period expected 
price  of  the  (depreciated)  investment  good.  When  installation  costs  are  positive,  then  the 
marginal cost and revenue of present investment are augmented by these costs. The last term 
of this equation takes into account that this installation cost decreases with the capital stock, 
hence investing today will decrease the installation cost of next-period investment.  
This optimal investment decision depends on the expected prices of the investment good and 
the  expected  capital  returns.  The  latter  depend  on  the  expected  prices  of  outputs  and  the 
expected returns to other production factors. Accordingly if an agricultural policy scenario 
leads to some expected changes in output prices and capital returns, then farmers will react by 
modifying their investment decisions (and periodic production and input decisions as well). 
This will have subsequent impacts on future production and markets.  
   7 
1.1.2  Households’ behaviours 
Households’ decisions can also be decomposed between inter and intra temporal decisions. 
Households base their savings decisions on an inter-temporal trade-off: they spend a part of 
the income they earn at one period to consume goods, which brings them some utility, and 
save the remaining part. The part of the income saved at one period will be used later to 
consume and represents a future utility. So, the representative household in each region seeks 
to  maximize  the  value  of  its  inter-temporal  utility,  which  is  assumed  to  be  additively 
separable, subject to the constraint on wealth accumulation:   
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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With  r  a time preference parameter (households have a preference for immediate utility), 
rt Q  the composite quantity consumed,  t r PC , the composite consumer price,  t r W ,  the wealth of 
household (due to their ownerships of domestic and foreign capital assets),  rt E  the sum of 
labor and land earnings. Periodic household savings are simply given by:  
t r t r t r t r t r t r t r Q PC E rW W W S , , , , , 1 , , . - + = - = +  
The first order condition of this program determines the level of savings in each region:  
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We  again  get  an  implicit  equation  determining  the  optimal  evolution  of  consumption 
expenditure and savings in terms of expected consumer prices and expected incomes. Finally, 
the periodic income that is not saved is spent by the households to buy consumption goods so 
as to maximise their (Stone Geary) intra temporal utility.  
 
1.1.3  Equilibrium conditions 
Solving  an  infinite  horizon  dynamic  CGE  model  with  perfect  expectations  imposes  the 
modeller  to  define  steady  state  conditions  at  some  future  terminal  period.  The  equations 
determining investment (equation 1) and saving (equation 2) relate current decisions to next 
period decisions in terms of expected prices, incomes and returns. As usual (see for instance, 
Diao and Somwaru, 2000), we assume that the markets reach a steady state at some period T;   8 
from this period investment equals capital depreciation and the household real wealth does not 
grow:  
T r i r i T r i K I , , , , , d =                     (3) 
T r T r W W , 1 , = +                       (4) 
These two terminal conditions ensure that a country net debt is stable or, equivalently, that the 
country savings equals its investment at the steady state.  
Finally we mention that computing dynamic welfare gains is not straightforward when perfect 
expectations are assumed. It can not be computed as the discounted sum of yearly welfare 
effects  because  there  is  an optimal transition path that depends on prevailing prices. The 
consistent decomposition of the total welfare effect between an inter-temporal and an intra-
temporal welfare effect is described in appendix 1.  
 
1.2. The version with adaptive expectations 
In the perfect expectation version of the model described above, agents are assumed to know 
exactly the future market prices and factor returns. This assumption implies that agents have 
full information and are able to process it so as to perfectly anticipate the evolution of all 
markets. However, collecting and processing information can be costly, so it may be rational 
for agents to base their decision on an alternative form of expectations, different from the 
perfect ones (Just and Rausser, 2002). Furthermore the econometric estimations of farmers’ 
expectations generally conclude they form at best quasi rational expectations, often adaptive 
expectations (Nerlove and Bessler, 2001). These alternative expectation schemes are taken 
into account in a second version of our model in which we assume that agents do not know 
perfectly future prices and factor returns. Instead they form some expectations, based on past 
observations,  about  them.  We  have  chosen  in  that  case  to  adopt  an  adaptive  form  of 
expectations, originally proposed by Nerlove (1958), which are such that: 
( ) 1 1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 t t t t t t P P P P P P a a a - - - - -   = + - = + -   , 0 1 a < £           (3) 
Here  ˆ
t P   denotes  the  price  expected  for  period  t,  and  the  a   parameter  can  be  seen  as  a 
measure  of  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  expectations.  In  fact  the  lower  a   is,  the  slower 
expectations  adjust  to  market  changes.  An  extreme  case  of  Nerlovian  expectations  arises 
when  a   equals  1:  economic  agents  only  consider  the  previous  period  to  form  their   9 
expectations. These are called naïve expectations. At the opposite, if this parameter equals 
zero,  then  agents  have  constant  expectations:  they  do  not  change  with  previous  market 
conditions. Considering adaptive instead of perfect expectations implies some changes to the 
model. These changes concern the execution of the model and equilibrium conditions.  
 
1.2.1. Execution of the model 
When economic agents have perfect expectations, the prices they expect to prevail for the 
next period are conform to the economic theory. It implies that at the first period consumers 
and producers base their decisions on future market prices as determined by the model. All 
the decisions are thus taken at the first period for all subsequent periods and do not need to be 
re  adjusted in the future: the model is solved  once  for  all period simultaneously. On the 
contrary,  when  agents  have  adaptive  expectations,  they  re-adjust  their  decisions  at  each 
period;  the  model  is  thus  solved  iteratively,  period  by  period  as  a  temporary  general 
equilibrium (Grandmont, 1977). This does not prevent that at each period agents make plans 
for  several  future  periods  to  take  their  inter-temporal  (investment  and  savings)  decisions. 
More  precisely,  we  assume  that  at  each  period,  producers  define  an  investment  plan  for 
several future periods with some price/return expectations. We furthermore assume that, due 
to their imperfect information, producers define this investment plan over a finite (rather than 
infinite) horizon. After some transition period, we assume that producers consider that their 
investments will be equal to their capital depreciation. Indeed this firm steady state condition 
may never appear because firms periodically revise their plans, but this formulation defines 
the current optimal investment plan for firms, including the current investment. Basically we 
face the same issue for households’ dynamic decisions. They save today part of their income 
for future consumption without accurate knowledge of future prices and returns. We assume 
that their current saving decision is also determined by a dynamic program with a steady state 
condition stipulating that wealth no longer accumulates after some period. But the level of this 
terminal constraint changes every period.  
Secondly  some  particularities  of  agricultural  sectors  need  to  be  considered  here.  Indeed, 
contrary to some other agents who may observe current market prices at time they take their 
decisions, agricultural producers have to decide the quantities to produce and inputs to use 
before knowing the market price of their production; they thus base their production decisions 
on expectations. This distinctive feature of agricultural sectors does not have any impact on 
the execution of the model if farmers have perfect expectations, whereas it needs to be taken   10 
into account in the case of adaptive expectations. To do so, the model is solved in two steps at 
each  period.  In  a  first  step  agricultural  production  decisions  are  taken  based  on  farmers’ 
expectations about selling prices and given their capital stocks. In a second step the quantities 
produced are put on the markets, all decisions by other agents are taken and prices adjust so as 
to ensure the intra temporal equilibrium for the period. 
 
1.2.2. Equilibrium conditions 
Contrary to the perfect expectation case, here investment and savings decisions are taken 
independently.  Accordingly  nothing  in  the  model  guaranties  the  equality  between  global 
savings  and  global  investments.  To  overcome  this  issue,  we  make  endogenous  the  world 
interest  rate  which  adjusts  to  ensure  the  equality  between  global  world  savings  and 
investments at each period. 
Furthermore,  in  a  model  where  future  prices  are  perfectly  anticipated,  an  inter-temporal 
equilibrium prevails (Pereira and Shoven, 1988). On the other hand, in the case of imperfect 
expectations, decisions and future plans are readjusted at each period: even if agents expect a 
future steady state to be realized when they take their inter temporal decisions, this state 
steady  might  not  effectively  be  reached.  Consequently,  we  may  have  a  succession  of 
temporary short run equilibriums, instead of an inter-temporal equilibrium, without reaching a 
steady state (Grandmont, 1977).
1 It means for instance that at each period the gap between 
regional savings and investments can be financed by other regions through a foreign debt 
increase. In that case the steady state where capital stocks and foreign assets/debts are stable 
may never occur. Despite this issue, we can still compute welfare effects at each period. We 
follow  Ballard  (1987)  by  computing  welfare  on  effective  periodic  consumptions,  thus 
neglecting periodic savings.  
 
2. Empirical framework 
We  use  the  GTAP  database  calibrated  on  the  2001  economic  flows  to  run  our  policy 
simulations.  As  usual  we  reduce  the  dimension  of  the  empirical  model.  These  data  are 
                                                 
1 The other critical issue of existence of this suite of temporary general equilibrium points is discussed below   11 
aggregated to 3 regions (the EU, the US and the Rest of the World (Row) and to 10 sectors, 
among which 7 are agricultural sectors.
2  
 
The calibration of most behavioural parameters is identical to the calibration in the static 
GTAP-AGR model. The main exception concerns the substitution elasticities used to calibrate 
the nested CES functions of arable crop production technologies. Indeed, the ex post supply 
price elasticities are rather high in the static GTAP-AGR model because this model aims to 
simulate the long term effects of policy reforms. On the other hand, our dynamic framework 
simulates  a  sequence  of  short  term  effects,  and  agricultural  supply  adjusts  less  to  price 
changes in the short term. Moving from the static specification to dynamic specifications 
already reduces these short run supply responses because the capital stock is fixed in the short 
run. Nevertheless the resulting supply elasticities remain still too high compared to usual 
elasticities used in partial equilibrium analyses of agricultural policies (see table 1, panel a). 
In fact fixing the capital stock has a low impact on supply elasticities because the capital 
returns often represent low shares in total production costs. That’s the reason why we reduce 
all substitution elasticities in arable crop technologies to 0.1. The resulting own price supply 
elasticities are reported in table 1, panel b.  
 
(Insert table 1) 
 
Furthermore additional parameters, compared to the static model, have to be calibrated in our 
dynamic models (see equations 1 and 2). For that purpose, we follow  Devarajan and Go 
(1998) and assume that the initial 2001 data correspond to a steady state. We also assume that 
the initial interest rate, the time preference parameter, and the capital adjustment parameter 
are all equal to 5 per cent. 
Finally, when we adopt imperfect expectations, we also need to assume the horizon of the 
firms’ investment plans as well as the horizon of households’ optimal sequence of savings. 
We tested for different horizons (from 3 years to 8 years) and did not find substantial impacts. 
So we adopt a 3  year horizon in both cases. We also need to determine the precise way 
expectations  are  formed.  Here  we  face  some  resolution  issues  already  encountered  by 
                                                 
2 These 10 sectors are: wheat, coarse grains, oilseeds, other crops, cattle, meat production, other food products, 
manufactured goods, services, trade and transport.    12 
previous  authors  with  non  linear  economic  models  (for  instance,  Hommes  1994).  If 
expectations  are  close  to  be  naïve,  then  the  dynamic  system  quickly  diverges  as  in  the 
standard cobweb model. On the other hand, when these expectations are more stable because 
all past prices/returns are taken into account, then our dynamic system no longer diverges. We 
focus our analysis of simulation results on these non divergent cases. We start assuming that 
the  a  parameter equals 1/5 for all agents and for all decisions (periodic production/ multi 
period investment). Then a sensitivity analysis of the results on this crucial parameter will be 
offered.  
 
3. Simulation results 
We simulate the complete removal of the CAP instruments in the arable crop sectors (wheat, 
other cereals and oilseeds) in order to maximise the resulting economic impacts on these 
sectors. On the other hand we maintain CAP instruments in livestock sectors. This illustrative 
scenario also allows us to circumvent the question of how particular instruments operate at the 
margin in these arable crop sectors. Practically, we remove export subsidies, import tariffs 
and direct payments as they are modelled in the static GTAP-AGR framework (a subsidy to 
land use). As said above, our models are calibrated on 2001 figures using the GTAP database. 
A real policy analysis must start building a realistic baseline incorporating all policy changes 
already implemented or projected. Since 2001 the CAP has been reformed twice (in 2003 with 
the so-called Mid Term Review, in 2008 with the so-called Health Check) but these reforms 
mainly affect livestock sectors. So we make the simplest assumption to define the baseline: 
we assume that the year 2001 is a steady state and does replicate in all subsequent years.  
We then consider two implementations of our illustrative CAP reform. In the first case, we 
assume that this reform is abruptly applied in 2013. In the second case, we assume a linear 
gradual implementation of this reform from 2013 to 2017. In other words, we implement each 
year a 20 per cent reduction of the pre-reform levels of policy instruments. In both cases, we 
assume that EU governments agree upon and announce this radical reform in 2011. We thus 
start simulating our model from 2011 when the policy reform is announced.  
 
3.1. Impact on the steady state of a brutal implementation with perfect expectations 
Before analysing transition dynamics and the optimal implementation of agricultural policy 
reforms, it is useful to understand the steady state impacts of this reform on farm markets.   13 
Here we focus on the simplest case of a brutal implementation with perfect expectations by all 
economic agents.
3  
Table 2 reports the main steady state impacts of our reform. As expected the suppression of 
tariffs,  export  subsidies  and,  above  all,  direct  payments  in  the  EU  induces  a  decrease  of 
production of wheat (by 16.5 per cent) and other cereals (by 12.4 per cent). The production 
drop is smaller (by 6.3 per cent) in the European oilseeds sector because the share of direct 
payments in total revenues is initially smaller in this sector and there is no tariffs nor export 
subsidies.  
 
(Insert table 2) 
 
In  these  sectors,  primary  factor  uses  decrease  as  expected:  land  uses  decrease  more  than 
capital. For instance the capital stock in the wheat sector decreases by 15.9 per cent and the 
land use by 22.2 per cent. So there is a small change in production technologies toward more 
input-intensive technologies because the land input subsidy is removed. The returns to land in 
arable  crop  sectors  dramatically  drop  (by  as  much  as  83  per  cent  in  the  wheat  sector). 
Accordingly we observe a reallocation of land towards the “still protected” livestock sectors 
(land  use  for  fodder  production  increases  by  13.6  per  cent).  This  does  explain  the  slight 
increase in cattle production (by 0.3 per cent).  
On the EU agricultural markets, we also obtain a significant reduction of EU exports of arable 
crops (by as much as 33.5 per cent for wheat). The removal of export subsidies partly explains 
these results. This reduction is however lower than the production drop, so we end up with 
higher  EU  real  producer  prices  of  arable  crops  (for  instance  by  7.1  per  cent  for  wheat). 
Without surprise, the impact on US and RoW farm markets are in the opposite directions. For 
instance, their exports of arable crops increase (by 4.4 per cent for the US wheat, by 9.9 per 
cent  for  RoW  wheat),  their  production  expands  as  well.  The  increases  are  partly  to  the 
detriment of their livestock productions.  
At the steady state obtained after 15 years of simulation, the yearly EU welfare increases from 
the  CAP  reform  because  some  distorting  impacts  of  this  policy  are  suppressed.  The 
discounted  (to  2011)  EU  economic  welfare  increases  by  580  million  US$  in  2025.  By 
                                                 
3 The perfect expectation version of the model was first solved over 15 years, then over 16 years. Market and 
welfare results were robust to this choice of the terminal year.    14 
contrast, the RoW suffers from welfare losses because this region is a net importer of arable 
crops and the world prices of these products increase (discounted loss of 255 millions US$ in 
2025). Finally the US economy experiences a small welfare gains (by 20 million US dollar in 
2025).  
 
3.2. The transitory dynamics 
Before discussing welfare effects, we first analyse the dynamics of the EU wheat market. The 
dynamics observed on other markets exhibit the same qualitative patterns. Figure 1 (2) reports 
the evolution of the European wheat price (production) for the different simulations. A first 
thing to note is that the long term effect, a 7.1% increase of wheat price is the same for all the 
simulations. The transition paths however are different: whereas prices rapidly converge to 
their  steady  state  value  in  the  perfect  foresight  setting,  they  fluctuate  much  more  when 
expectations are adaptive, especially if the reform is abruptly implemented.  
 
(Insert figures 1 and 2) 
 
Let’s start with the perfect expectation results. Producers perfectly anticipate the effects of the 
reform. Once announced, they immediately adjust downwards their investment levels while 
other input decisions (land, fertilizer, pesticides, …) are already made. This reduction of first 
year (2011) investment is logically greater in the abrupt implementation than in the gradual 
implementation.  Accordingly  the  EU  wheat  production  in  the  second  year  (2012)  already 
decreases even if the reform is effectively implemented from 2013 onwards. This reduction 
amounts  to  1.4  per  cent  in  the  gradual  implementation,  up  to  2.4  per  cent  in  the  abrupt 
implementation with respect to the no-reform benchmark. That’s the main reason why we also 
observe an increase of the EU wheat price in that second year (by 0.7 per cent in the gradual 
implementation, by 1.2 per cent in the brutal implementation).  
The EU wheat producers continue to adjust downwards their investment in the second year 
(2012). They also modify their other input decisions (intermediate inputs, land and labor) 
because they perfectly anticipate the price/returns effects of the following years. In particular, 
they perfectly anticipate the major effects of the (partial/total) removal of direct payments in 
the  third  year.  The  EU  wheat  production  declines  by  5.9  per  cent  in  the  gradual   15 
implementation, up to 13.2 per cent in the brutal implementation. So there is a huge difference 
in that third year between the two implementations due to the greater modifications in the 
optimal combination of variable inputs with installed physical capital.  
This  process  of  adjustment  quickly  converges  to  the  steady  state  with  the  abrupt 
implementation. It is more slowly with the gradual implementation because producers still 
benefit from (declining) CAP price supports and subsidies.  
The  transition  dynamic  is  completely  different  with  imperfect  expectations  by  economic 
agents. Even if the reform is announced in 2011, agents do not adjust in the first years because 
they  are  backward  looking.  To  justify  this  assumption,  one  possible  interpretation  is  that 
agents  believe  that  the  reform  is  not  credible  and  will  not  be  applied.
4  Another  possible 
interpretation is that agents are not able to figure out their relative competitiveness and the 
true characteristics of all markets. So they are initially passive and wait to learn from market 
developments.  When  the  reform  is  effectively  implemented  (in  2013),  the  EU  wheat 
producers  significantly  loss  money  (compared  to  the  no  reform  benchmark)  because  they 
produce the same quantity of output but they now no longer benefits from former subsidy and 
price  support  levels.  The  EU  wheat  price  declines  by  1  per  cent  with  the  gradual 
implementation, by 4.6 per cent with the brutal implementation.  
Because producers are backward looking and just experience negative income effects, they 
start adjusting their farming system. This adjustment is naturally more important with the 
abrupt implementation because their income losses (capital returns and land returns) are more 
significant. So they considerably revise their combination of variable inputs and also their 
investment. In fact it appears that they sell part of their capital when the reform is abruptly 
implemented. They only do not invest when the reform is gradually implemented. The main 
consequence is that the EU wheat production significantly drops in that third year when the 
reform is abruptly implemented. It decreases by 24.7 per cent leading to a subsequent huge 
price effect (by 23 per cent). By contrast, this production decreases by 7.2 per cent with the 
gradual implementation, leading to a more moderate price effect (4.7 per cent).  
We observe that this process of adjustment converge rather rapidly to the steady state with the 
gradual implementation. On the other hand, the price and production patterns exhibit more 
pronounced  variations  with  the  abrupt  implementation.  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the 
production drops by as much as 31 per cent in 2016, three years after the completion of the 
                                                 
4 Agreed reforms often include conditional clauses.    16 
CAP reform. In other words, we observe on this wheat market that the series do not start 
converging to the steady state once the reform is completely implemented. The situation is 
opposite on the EU coarse grain market (not shown). Production and price effects on this 
market in the first year of reform are even more distant to their steady state levels. In the first 
year after the completion of the reform, we observe in this market a convergence towards the 
steady state levels. This initial convergence on the coarse grain market is to the detriment of 
the initial convergence on the wheat market.  
Figure 3 represents the evolution of the welfare effects induced by the reform in the different 
simulation settings. It appears, first, that the long term European welfare gains are higher 
when expectations are adaptive, whatever the way the reform is implemented: they amount to 
about US$150 million, compared to US$100 million in the perfect expectations setting. The 
reason for these differences lies in the macroeconomic closure of the model. Indeed, in the 
adaptive  version  of  the  model  the  endogenous  world  interest  rate  allows  European 
investments to be financed by other regions through an accumulation of the foreign debt. By 
contrast regional investments have to be entirely financed by regional savings, and foreign 
debts/assets have to be stable from the steady state period in the perfect foresight version. 
Long term European investments, capital stocks and capital income are thus higher in the 
adaptive  expectation  model,  which  in  turns  leads  to  higher  disposable  income  for 
consumption and to higher European welfare gains.  
 
(Insert figure 3) 
 
If  agents  have  perfect  foresight  the  welfare  effects  are  positive  in  all  cases  all  along  the 
transition path and slightly higher when the reform is implemented immediately because the 
gains are reaped earlier. It thus appears that in the case of perfect foresights an immediate 
reform is preferable to a gradual one. On the other hand, when expectations are adaptive the 
welfare gains are lower during the 10 first simulation periods, and, above all, the immediate 
implementation of the reform generates significant welfare losses (among US$1.2 billion) 
during  the  8  first  periods.  These  welfare  losses  first  come  from  the  adjustment  costs 
associated with farmers’ disinvestment. As explained above, the EU farmers strongly adjust 
downwards their capital stocks with the abrupt implementation in the first years following the 
reform. They thus pay significant des-installation costs. In the first year of the reform, they   17 
amount to 203 millions US$ (compared to 20 millions US$ with the gradual implementation) 
for the three arable crops sectors together. A second source of welfare effects is the foreign 
investment effect. The EU value of total investment decreases following the reform while the 
saving is rather stable. This leads to a small decrease of the world interest rate (by 0.06 per 
cent). This also implies that the EU economy partly finances foreign investments. We thus 
also observe significant different welfare effects in the other regions. For instance, the US 
economy in the second year of the reform (2014) experiences a higher welfare gain with the 
abrupt  implementation  (663  millions  US$)  compared  to  the  gradual  implementation  (174 
million  US$).  As  expected  the  world  welfare  effects  are  initially  lower  with  the  brutal 
implementation because other regions also incur adjustment costs.  
 
3.3. Sensitivity analysis 
In this subsection we test the robustness of the short run welfare losses previously analysed in 
the case of an abrupt implementation with imperfect expectations.  
Our first sensitivity  analysis focuses on the imperfect expectations of  farmers. So far  we 
assume that agents slowly learn from market developments. This is reflected in the nerlovian 
parameter  equal  to  one  fifth.  We  now  assume  that  farmers  react  more  strongly  to  last 
price/return observations. This parameter is now set to one half. If we impose this parameter 
to all dynamic decisions, our dynamic system diverges. On the other hand, if we impose this 
parameter only to the variable input decisions  while letting unchanged this parameter for 
investment  decisions,  then  our  dynamic  system  converges  to  a  steady  state.  The  figure  4 
reports the effects of the EU welfare. We observe that our main result is quite robust: there are 
initially welfare losses. We also observe that the results oscillate much more before reaching 
the steady state. The welfare effects often turn from positive to negative and vice versa before 
stabilizing in the positive range. The intuition is the following: the more farmers strongly 
react  to  last  price/return  changes,  the  higher  are  the  endogenous  market  fluctuations  and 
adjustment costs.  
 
(Insert figure 4) 
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Our  second  sensitivity  analyses  focuses  on  the  crucial  adjustment  cost  parameter  (see 
equation 1). In the standard case, this parameter is such that installation costs represent 5 per 
cent of investment purchases. We now assume it to represent 2.5 per cent and 7.5 per cent of 
investment purchases. The impacts on EU welfare are provided in the figure 5. It appears that 
the initial welfare losses are even greater when these adjustment costs are low. This counter 
intuitive result can be explained as follows. When these adjustment costs are lower, then the 
farmers adjust their physical capital more strongly. For instance the EU wheat production 
decreases by as much as 42 per cent following the reform (compared to 31 per cent in the 
standard  case).  This  also  implies  stronger  adjustment  in  other  sectors  (like  in  the  cattle 
production). In other words, the low adjustment costs favour stronger market fluctuations. 
Assuming higher adjustment costs have the symmetric effect. Initial welfare losses are more 
muted but still remain.  
 
(Insert figure 5) 
 
Conclusion 
What  is  the  best  way  to  implement  an  agricultural  policy  reform?  This  issue  is  often 
overlooked in economic analysis of farm policies where the focus is on the long run, steady 
state impacts. In this paper we perform a determinist dynamic CGE analysis allowing agents 
to form imperfect versus perfect expectations. Using an illustrative CAP reform scenario, we 
simulate an abrupt versus a gradual implementation of this reform. 
Our results show that if economic agents are able to perfectly anticipate the impacts of the 
reform,  then  delaying  its  implementation  is  never  optimal.  They  start  adjusting  their 
production patterns once the reform is announced, so that the markets smoothly reach their 
steady states. On the other hand, if agents gradually learn from market developments, then we 
find some cases where a gradual implementation of this reform is welfare improving. By 
contrast an abrupt implementation generates initial losses due to significant adjustment costs. 
These initial losses are all the more important that agents, in particular farmers, strongly react 
to last price observations. Accordingly it may be optimal to gradually implement reforms so 
that agents smoothly learn from market developments.  
Even  if  our  modelling  framework  offers  some  improvements  with  respect  to  traditional 
models used to assess farm policies, some additional efforts are needed to address the impacts   19 
of  some  modelling  assumptions.  In  particular  we  neglect  in  our  dynamic  framework  the 
various sources of risks present in farm markets as well the risk aversion of farmers. It is 
however  not  clear  whether  this  will  challenge  our  main  conclusion.  Adding  risks  and/or 
uncertainty may further raise the economic optimality of gradual policy reforms so that agents 
are able to discern the effects of reform from the expression of risky events (Calvo Pardo, 
2009).   20 
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Table 1. Arable crop own price supply elasticities 
a. With standard substitution elasticities 














b. With revised substitution elasticities 
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Table 2. Steady state impacts of a brutal CAP reform on agricultural markets when perfect expectations are assumed (percentage 
changes with respect to the baseline) 
 
  EU  US  RoW 
  Wheat  Other 
Cereals 
Oilseeds  Cattle  Wheat  Other 
Cereals 
Oilseeds  Cattle  Wheat  Other 
Cereals 
Oilseeds  Cattle 
Production  -16.5  -12.4  -6.3  0.3  2.5  0.7  0.4  -0.1  1.8  1.0  0.4  -0.1 
Producer 
price  7.1  8.5  4.5  -0.8  1.3  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.1 
Exports  -33.5  -31.1  -13.3  1.6  4.4  2.8  0.8  -0.7  9.9  8.9  2.5  -0.8 
Land return  -83.0  -80.3  -70.5  -24.4  7.1  3.3  2.6  1.1  4.0  2.4  1.3  0.2 
Land use  -22.2  -19.2  -10.6  13.6  1.9  0.4  0.2  -0.4  1.4  0.8  0.3  0.0 
Capital stock  -15.9  -11.7  -5.9  2.3  2.6  0.8  0.4  -0.5  1.8  1.1  0.5  -0.2 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the European wheat price following the CAP reform (percentage 
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Figure 2. Evolution of the European wheat production following the CAP reform 
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Figure 3. Evolution of the Equivalent Variation of income in the EU following the CAP 
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Figure 4. Sensitivity of EU welfare effects following a brutal CAP reform to the 
















   28 
Figure 5. Sensitivity of EU welfare effects following a brutal CAP reform to the 
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Appendix. Computing dynamic welfare effects with perfect expectations 
In  static  CGE  models  welfare  effects  of  a  policy  reform  are  usually  measured  by  the 
Equivalent Variations (EV). This indicator corresponds to the additional amount of income a 
household would be willing to pay to reach the post reform level of utility, at pre reform 
prices. Formally, it is given by: 
( ) ( )
0 1 0 0 , , EV E P U E P U = - ,  
with  ( ) . E  the household’s consumption expenditure function, 
0 P  the pre reform prices and 
0 U  and 
1 U  the respectively pre and post utility levels. 
In current existing dynamic CGE models, the equivalent variation is often computed globally, 
as  in  Diao  and  Somwaru  (2000)  for  instance,  in  which  the  global  welfare  effect  z  
corresponds to the share of additional pre reform consumption necessary to reach the post 
reform utility level
5:  
( ) ( ) ( )
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However this computation does not reveal the transition path in terms of welfare effects. One 
could be tempted to assume that the overall EV is equal to the discounted sum of the period 









+ ∑ , with  ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 0 0 , , t t t t t ev e p u e p u = - .  
This formulation, for instance used in the Linkage model (van der Mensbrugghe, 2005), gives 
one  path  of  welfare  effects.  However  the  discounted  sum  of  within  period  equivalent 
variations does not necessarily equal the overall equivalent variation. Indeed, Keen (1990) 
demonstrates that: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




E P U e p H p E P U =∑  
with  ( ) ( ) , ,
t
t U H p E P U  the optimal part of U  allocated to period t, when the prices in period 
t are equal to  t p  and the overall price of utility is equal to  ( ) , U E P U . 
                                                 
5  Here we assume that the economy to be in steady state before the shock, 
0 0, t q q t = " .   30 
Let 
1b
t u  denotes the part of 
1 U allocated to period t when prices are equal to their pre-shock 
levels. It is defined by:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 , , , ,
b t t
t t U t U t u H p E P U H p E P U u = ¹ =  
As a matter of fact: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
, , , ,
1
t b t
t t t t t
t
EV E P U E P U e p u e p u
r
= - = -
+ ∑  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
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Here  t p   denotes  the  inter-temporal  equivalent  variations  and  represents  the  price  the 
household is willing to pay to re allocate their utility across periods. Both inter temporal ( t p ) 
and intra temporal (evt ) equivalent variations thus have to be taken into account to study the 
path of welfare gains or losses along with time. So, in order to get the transition path of 
welfare effects, we rely on Keen’s work to find an expression of the evt  and  t p  in our model.  
More precisely we need to compute  ( )
0 1 ,
t
rt rt e p u  and  ( )
0 1 ,
t b
rt rt e p u  to be able to compute evt  
and  t p .  ( )
0 1 ,
t
rt rt e p u  represents the minimum amount a household would be willing to pay to 
reach the utility 
1
rt u  at price 
0
rt p  in period t. This expenditure is computed with simulated 
post reform consumption values and the parameters of the intra temporal Stone Geary utility 
functions.  
Regarding  ( )
0 1 ,
t b
rt rt e p u , 
1b
rt u  is the optimal part of 
1 U  allocated to period t at price 
0
rt p . 
This is the solution of the following optimisation program: 
( ) ( )
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